Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2018

State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Patrick Bobby Galindo, Jr.,
Defendant/Appellant : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; hosted by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Cherise Bacalski, Bacalski Legal PLLC; Emily Adams, Adams Legal LLC; counsel for appellant.
Christopher D. Ballard, Sean Reyes, Utah Attorney General; Christopher L. Shaw, Gage H. Arnold,
Weber County Attorney's Office; counsel for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Galindo, No. 20180116 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2018).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3775

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Public
Case No. 20180116-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

PATRICK BOBBY GALINDO, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from a conviction for attempted murder, a first degree
felony, and a guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a
restricted person, a second degree felony, in the Second
Judicial District, Weber County, the Honorable Ernie W. Jones
presiding

CHERISE BACALSKI
Bacalski Legal PLLC
51 W. Center Street, #315
Orem, UT 84057
cherisebacalski@gmail.com
Emily Adams
Adams Legal LLC
P.O. Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
eadams@admaslegalllc.com
Counsel for Appellant

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497)
Assistant Solicitor General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
(801) 366-0180
cballard@agutah.gov
CHRISTOPHER L. SHAW
GAGE H. ARNOLD
Weber County Attorney’s Office
Counsel for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... III
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .............................................................................. 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................. 4
A. Summary of facts. ....................................................................................... 4
B. Procedural history. ..................................................................................... 8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 10
ARGUMENT........................................................................................................... 13
I.

Counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to Defendant’s
competency because there is no evidence that Defendant was
incompetent; competency evaluations resolved counsel’s initial
concerns and Defendant further demonstrated his competency
during his police interview and plea colloquy. .......................................... 13
A. Defendant cannot show prejudice because he offers no
evidence that he was incompetent at all. .............................................. 14
B. Defendant cannot show deficient performance because he
misunderstands, and thus fails to satisfy, Strickland’s deficient
performance standard. ............................................................................. 16
1. Strickland’s deficient performance standard requires
Defendant to prove that his counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable, not merely that it lacked a
conceivable tactical basis. .................................................................... 17
2. Defendant has not shown that counsel’s stipulation that
Defendant was competent was objectively unreasonable
where all evidence demonstrated that Defendant was
competent. ............................................................................................. 21

-i-

3. The evaluations dispelled trial counsel’s initial concerns
about Defendant’s competency. .........................................................30
C. Defendant’s guilty plea waived any challenge to his
conviction for possessing a firearm as a restricted person. ................34
II. Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for not
consulting with one of the evaluators because this claim depends
on extra-record evidence. ...............................................................................36
III. The cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable because a single
prejudicial error would entitle Defendant to relief and, in any
event, Defendant has shown no error. ..........................................................37
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................38
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................................40
ADDENDA
Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (2017)
Addendum B: Dr. Hawks’s evaluation (R53-65)
Addendum C: Dr. Wilkinson’s evaluation (R41-48)
Addendum D: Plea Affidavit (R175-80)

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013) .......................................................................... 18
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) .............................................................. 18
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011) ................................................................ 18, 19
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) ............................................ 16, 17, 18, 19
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .............................. 14, 16, 17, 18, 19
United States v. Bell, 280 Fed. Appx. 548 (7th Cir. 2008).................................... 30
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003) ................................................................ 18
STATE CASES
Ellis v. State, 2014 UT 50, 321 P.3d 1174 .............................................................. 28
Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, 20 P.3d 382 ................................................................ 28
State v. Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, 428 P.3d 36 ................................... 14, 15, 36
State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998) ............................................... 35
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, 89 P.3d 162 ................................................................. 17
State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18 ..................................................................................... 35
State v. Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, 414 P.3d 559,
cert. granted 421 P.3d 439 ....................................................................... 15, 16, 19
State v. King, 2018 UT App 190, 875 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 ..................................... 3
State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, 872 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 ................... 36

-iii-

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) ........................................................ 33
State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, 974 P.2d 279 ............................................................... 35
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, 167 P.3d 1046 ............................................... 33, 34
State v. Sessions, 2014 UT 44, 342 P.3d 738 .......................................................... 19
Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 156 P.3d 739............................................................. 14
York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994) ................................................. 28
STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §77-15-2(2) (2017) ............................................................... 20, 31
STATE RULES
Utah R. App. P. 23B ................................................................................................. 3

-iv-

Case No. 20180116-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

PATRICK BOBBY GALINDO, JR.,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
Although Defendant shot the victim four times, the victim survived
and identified Defendant from a photo lineup. Defendant’s fingerprints were
also on the magazine of the gun that fired the bullets.
I. After Defendant was charged, Defendant’s counsel requested a pretrial competency evaluation because Defendant allegedly appeared to be
unable to understand the proceedings and make rational decisions. After two
court-appointed psychologists examined Defendant and found that he was
competent, counsel stipulated to Defendant’s competency.
Defendant complains that this was ineffective assistance.

But

Defendant cannot carry his burden to prove ineffectiveness because he offers
no evidence of prejudice—a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

stipulation he would have been found incompetent.

There can be no

prejudice here for two reasons: (1) the competency evaluations conclusively
resolved counsel’s initial concerns; and (2) Defendant’s performance during
his police interview and his plea colloquy to a bifurcated charge supported
the evaluators’ unequivocal conclusions that Defendant was competent. For
these same reasons, Defendant cannot prove deficient performance.
Reasonable counsel could choose to stipulate to Defendant’s competency
after both evaluators found Defendant competent and the record
overwhelmingly supported that conclusion.
Defendant appears to challenge his convictions for both attempted
murder and possession of a firearm by a restricted person. But the trial court
bifurcated the firearm-possession charge and Defendant pled guilty to it after
the jury convicted him of attempted murder.

Defendant therefore can

challenge only his attempted murder conviction in this appeal because his
guilty plea waived any non-jurisdictional defect in his firearm-possession
conviction.
II. Defendant also complains that his counsel was ineffective for not
consulting with one of the evaluators. But Defendant cannot prove this claim
because it depends on extra-record evidence. Defendant seeks a rule 23B
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remand to augment the record, but this Court should deny remand for the
reasons explained in the accompanying response to Defendant’s motion.
III. The cumulative-error doctrine is inapplicable because a single
prejudicial error—had Defendant proved one—would entitle him to relief.
Regardless, Defendant has not shown any error.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Defendant demonstrated his competency during his police

interview, two competency evaluations, and a plea colloquy. The record
contains no evidence of incompetency other than counsel’s initial concerns
that were ultimately resolved by the competency evaluations. Has Defendant
shown that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to his competency after
both evaluators unequivocally found him competent?
2. In an affidavit filed in support of a rule 23B motion for remand, trial
counsel reasserts and expands upon his initial concerns about Defendant’s
competency. Absent a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, can Defendant show that his counsel was ineffective for not
consulting with one of his competency evaluators?
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Standard of Review for Issues 1 & 2. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims raised for the first time on appeal are questions of law reviewed de
novo. State v. King, 2018 UT App 190, ¶11, 875 Utah Adv. Rep. 13.
3. Does the cumulative error doctrine entitle Defendant to relief?
Standard of Review. None applies.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.
Around 1:30 a.m. on a June morning, Ramon Guzman and his friend
were walking along an Ogden street when someone started yelling insults at
them from an apartment window.

R768-71,777,838-40,928-30.

Guzman

responded that if the people in the apartment had “a problem” they should
“come down here.” R929-30. They accepted his challenge. R768-69,930-31.
Three men came out to the street and continued yelling at Guzman and
his friend. R768-71,930-31. After someone yelled “bring it over here mother
f----,” the three men, one armed with a handgun, sprinted across the street
towards Guzman and his friend, who each drew a knife. R768-72,930-32,
807,811-12. But before a physical fight could begin, four gunshots rang out.
R772,807,811-12.

Although all four bullets hit Guzman, he survived.

R840,847-48.
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After the shooting, the three men ran back towards the apartment
building they had come from. R773-74. Mike Martinez rented the apartment.
R1124-25.

Defendant and several others had gathered there that night,

including Defendant’s “homies” Isaiah Moncada and Luis Lara.

R865-

68;SE#64 at 10:35-10:50.
Police responded and found Moncada and Lara in the apartment.
R865-68. They each matched an eyewitness’s description of two of the men
who had been involved in the shooting. R868,903-04.
Eyewitnesses further noted that two of the three men were tall, but the
third—who was between the two and directly in front of Guzman—was
“dramatically shorter.” R770,808. Defendant was three inches shorter than
Moncada and Lara. R869-70.
Additional evidence identified Defendant as the shooter. Guzman got
a good look at his shooter’s face and later picked Defendant’s photo from a
lineup when asked to identify who shot him. R845,880. In fact, when
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Guzman saw Defendant’s photo he “ripped” it from the detective’s hand and
exclaimed, “That’s him.”1 R880.
Police found a loaded and cocked .22 caliber handgun behind a
building near the apartment building. R718-18; State’s Exhibits (SE) #35-40.
Defendant left his fingerprints on that gun’s magazine. R872-73,1045,1071.
Police also recovered three of the four shell casings, all of which were fired
from that gun. R706-07,755,957.
It took police two and a-half weeks to find and arrest Defendant. R88182,920-21. A detective interviewed him at the police station. R886-87;SE#64.
Defendant admitted that on the night of the shooting he and his girlfriend
were with his “homies” Isaiah Moncada and Luis Lara in the apartment near
the shooting, and that he had walked through the area where police found
the handgun. R891;SE#64 at 10:35-10:50; 27:00-27:50.
But Defendant claimed that he and his girlfriend did not leave the
apartment until after the gunshots. SE#64 at 10:50-11:05; 13:00-14:35. When

Guzman’s friend identified Luis Lara from a photo lineup. R94748,1003-06. The friend told police that he “was almost 100% sure” the person
he identified was the shooter. R1005-06. But the friend later explained that
he had been more focused on the person who was in front of him, and not on
the shooter. R933-34,942-43.
1
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the detective told Defendant that his fingerprints were on the gun, Defendant
first claimed that he had never seen or touched the gun, but later said that
someone had pulled it on him two days before the shooting. SE#64 at 28:0030:35.
At trial, Defendant’s girlfriend admitted that she and Defendant were
at the apartment on the night of the shooting. R1091-92. But in contrast to
Defendant’s claim to police that he had never touched the gun, his girlfriend
testified that she saw Defendant and others in the apartment passing the gun
around that night. R1091-92,1114. She admitted that she never told this to
police even though she knew Defendant had been charged with attempted
murder. R1117-18.
Mike Martinez, who rented the apartment where people had gathered
the night of the shooting, testified that Defendant, Moncada, and Lara were
at his apartment that night, but he did not remember seeing Defendant’s
girlfriend. R1124-28. Martinez did not see anyone displaying a gun or
passing one around that evening, but he was not in the living room with his
guests the entire time they were there. R1131,1136. Martinez remembered
that he heard gunshots outside after Defendant, Lara, and Moncada left his
apartment. R1129-30.
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B. Procedural history.
The State charged Defendant with one count each of attempted murder
and felony discharge of a firearm with serious bodily injury, both first-degree
felonies, and one count of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a
second-degree felony. R1.
Before trial, defense counsel asked the trial court to evaluate
Defendant’s competency. R34-37. Counsel asserted that after conversing
with Defendant during “the past several court hearings,” Defendant did “not
appear to be able to comprehend what [was] going on” or to “make rational
decisions regarding his case.” R37.
Both evaluators find Defendant competent
The trial court appointed two evaluators—Drs. Hawks and
Wilkinson—who examined Defendant and both found him competent. R4148,53-65 (copies of the evaluations are included in Addenda B & C).
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At the competency hearing, defense counsel stipulated that Defendant
was competent “based on those two reports.” R378.
On the first day of trial, the prosecution dismissed the felony discharge
of a firearm count. R597. The parties also agreed to bifurcate the possession
of a firearm count. R598,1250-61.
The jury convicted Defendant of attempted murder. R172. Defendant
then pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a restricted person.

R134-

40;R1251-60.
Both counsel and Defendant certify that he is competent to plead guilty
In conjunction with his guilty plea, Defendant signed an affidavit
certifying that he believed himself to be “free of any mental disease, defect,
or impairment that would prevent [him] from understanding what [he was]
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering [his] plea.”
R179. He also certified that he had read the statement, or had it read to him,
understood its contents, and adopted each of its statements. R179. Trial
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counsel certified that he had discussed the plea affidavit with Defendant and
that counsel believed that Defendant “fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent.” R180.
During the plea colloquy, Defendant cogently responded to all the
court’s questions. R1253-58. He told the court that he understood what was
happening and that his attorney had explained everything to him. R1257.
After observing and questioning Defendant, the court stated, “[Y]ou seem to
me like you’re comprehending and understanding what we’re doing here.”
R1257.
The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms of three
years to life for attempted murder and one to fifteen years for possessing a
firearm as a restricted person. R339-40. The court also ordered the sentences
to run concurrently with sentences Defendant was serving in two other cases.
R340.
Defendant timely appealed. R341.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to
his competency after two evaluations resolved his counsel’s concerns about
his mental state and found Defendant competent. Defendant cannot carry

-10-

his burden to show that his counsel was ineffective because he offers no
evidence of prejudice—a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s
stipulation, there is a reasonable probability the court would have found him
incompetent.

Both evaluators unequivocally found Defendant to be

competent, thus resolving counsel’s initial concerns.

Defendant also

demonstrated his competence during his police interview and plea colloquy.
There is no evidence that Defendant was incompetent.
Defendant also cannot demonstrate deficient performance—that his
counsel’s decision to stipulate was objectively unreasonable.

Defendant

claims that all he must show to prove deficient performance is that there was
no conceivable tactical basis for his counsel to stipulate to Defendant’s
competency. This Court’s case law supports that position. But both this
Court and Defendant misunderstand the deficient performance standard.
Deficient performance is measured by whether counsel’s performance is
objectively reasonable, not by whether it is good strategy. Although Utah
law may not be clear on this point, United States Supreme Court case law is.
It controls.
Defendant cannot show deficient performance because reasonable
counsel could decide to stipulate to Defendant’s competency where two
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evaluations unanimously and unequivocally resolved counsel’s initial
concerns about Defendant’s mental state and Defendant demonstrated his
competency during his police interview and plea colloquy.
During his police interview, Defendant demonstrated a rational and
factual understand of the criminal proceedings and possible punishments.
He also demonstrated the ability to converse about the charges and evidence
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. He articulated and
consistently maintained a coherent defense, despite the officer’s insistence
that the evidence all pointed to him. Both Defendant and his counsel also
certified that Defendant was competent when he entered his guilty plea.
Although Defendant challenges both of his convictions in this appeal,
his guilty plea waived all non-jurisdictional defects in his firearm-possession
conviction. Defendant can therefore challenge only his attempted murder
conviction in this appeal.
II. Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for not
consulting with one of the evaluators—Dr. Hawks. He claims that if counsel
had shared his additional observations about Defendant’s mental state with
Dr. Hawks, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have
found Defendant incompetent. Defendant includes his counsel’s additional
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observations in an affidavit and seeks a rule 23B remand to include these
observations in the appellate record. Because this claim depends on extrarecord evidence, this Court cannot grant relief absent a rule 23B remand. This
Court should not grant a remand for the reasons stated in the accompanying
response to Defendant’s remand motion.
III. Defendant argues that the cumulative-error doctrine entitles him
to relief.

But that doctrine is inapplicable for two reasons.

First, had

Defendant proven a reasonable probability that he was incompetent, he
would have been entitled to relief without any additional prejudice showing.
Second, Defendant has not shown any error that could accumulate in any
event.

ARGUMENT
I.
Counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to Defendant’s
competency because there is no evidence that Defendant was
incompetent; competency evaluations resolved counsel’s
initial concerns and Defendant further demonstrated his
competency during his police interview and plea colloquy.
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for stipulating to
Defendant’s competency after counsel had requested a competency
evaluation based on concerns that Defendant allegedly could not understand
the proceedings or make rational decisions. Br.Aplt.11-16. Defendant argues
-13-

that counsel should not have stipulated to Defendant’s competency because
the “psychologists’ reports confirmed trial counsel’s observations” and “no
sound trial strategy … includes sending a cognitively impaired client to stand
trial.” Br.Aplt.12-13. Defendant argues that he suffered prejudice because
“the trial court relied on [the stipulation] instead of conducting its own
review” of Defendant’s competency. Br.Aplt.14 (bolding omitted).
Defendant cannot carry his heavy burden to show that his counsel was
ineffective because he offers no evidence of prejudice—a reasonable
probability that he was incompetent. Moreover, Defendant cannot prove that
his counsel was deficient because reasonable counsel could decide to
stipulate to Defendant’s competency given Defendant’s demonstrated
abilities during his police interview, competency evaluations, and plea
colloquy.
A. Defendant cannot show prejudice because he offers no
evidence that he was incompetent at all.
To show that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove that
(1) his counsel performed deficiently, and (2) he was prejudiced as a result.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694 (1984). To prove that he
suffered Strickland prejudice, Defendant must prove that there is “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

-14-

of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Thus, to prove prejudice in the context of a competency issue, a defendant
must show a reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s deficient
performance, the defendant “would have been found incompetent.” State v.
Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶16, 428 P.3d 36; accord, Taylor v. State, 2007 UT
12, ¶95, 156 P.3d 739 (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim in part because
defendant “has not shown that, had a competency hearing been requested
and granted, the court would have found evidence of incompetence”).
Defendant cannot prove prejudice because there is no evidence of a
reasonable probability that the trial court would have found him to be
incompetent absent his counsel’s stipulation. Though counsel alleged that
Defendant seemed to be unable to understand the proceedings and make
rational decisions, two independent psychologists concluded otherwise after
complete competency evaluations.

R41-48,53-65.

Both evaluators

unequivocally concluded that Defendant was competent.

R55,47.

The

evaluations conclusively dispelled any concerns about Defendant’s
competency, whether from his counsel or some other source.
Moreover, both counsel and Defendant later certified that Defendant
was competent during the plea colloquy on the bifurcated charge on the last
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day of trial. R179-80. And the trial court noted that Defendant appeared
competent based on the court’s observations throughout trial and his
interaction with Defendant in particular during the plea colloquy. R1257.
Defendant therefore points to no evidence that would show that, but
for his counsel’s stipulation, there is a reasonable probability that the trial
court would have found him incompetent. To the contrary, all the evidence
shows that he was competent. He therefore has not proven prejudice. See
Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶16.
B. Defendant cannot show deficient performance because he
misunderstands, and thus fails to satisfy, Strickland’s deficient
performance standard.
Relying on State v. Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶32, 414 P.3d 559, cert.
granted 421 P.3d 439, Defendant argues that he can show that his counsel
performed deficiently merely by demonstrating “‘that there was no
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.’”

Br.Aplt.12 (quoting

Jamieson, 2017 UT App 236, ¶32). Defendant is incorrect. Although a footnote
in Jamieson supports Defendant’s argument, both Defendant and Jamieson
misunderstand Strickland’s deficient performance element.
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1. Strickland’s deficient performance standard requires
Defendant to prove that his counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable, not merely that it lacked a
conceivable tactical basis.
To show that his counsel performed deficiently, Defendant must show
more than that there was no conceivable tactical basis for his counsel’s
actions. Strickland measures deficient performance by whether counsel’s
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S.
at 688. Thus, the determinative question “is not whether counsel’s choices
were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. 470, 481 (2000).
An evaluation of possible strategic reasons for counsel’s decisions is
relevant to a Strickland deficient-performance analysis, but it is not
dispositive. Possible strategic explanations are relevant because Strickland
recognizes that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in
any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a
particular client in the same way.” 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, to ensure counsel
the flexibility to defend their clients in the way they believe is most effective,
the Strickland standard “strongly presume[s]” that counsel “made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.
at 690.
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Given this presumption, when conceivable tactical bases support trial
counsel’s actions, a defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that
his counsel performed reasonably. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶7, 89 P.3d
162 (explaining that defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that
“there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions”) (cleaned up)
(emphasis in original). The Strickland presumption of a sound strategy thus
can be dispositive, but only of a finding of effective performance, not deficient
performance.
The lack of a considered strategic basis for counsel’s performance does
not automatically render his performance objectively unreasonable.

See

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481. Even when a considered strategic reason for
counsel’s performance seems elusive, a defendant still cannot carry his
burden of proving deficient performance unless he can show that his
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Counsel’s performance is not deficient merely
because a reviewing court cannot conceive of a tactical basis for counsel’s
performance.
This is because the Strickland standard further recognizes that counsel
cannot possibly be expected to have a strategic reason for his every act or
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omission. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is not to
improve the quality of legal representation.’” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Rather, it is “‘simply to ensure that
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689). “Just as there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless
strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable
miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to
be remote possibilities.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 110 (2011).

Counsel performs deficiently only when overlooking an issue is “‘sufficiently
egregious and prejudicial,’” id. at 111 (citation omitted), that “no competent
attorney” would have missed it, Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011).
The Sixth Amendment therefore recognizes that counsel may “focus[]
on some issues to the exclusion of others.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8
(2003). When that occurs, “there is a strong presumption that [counsel] did
so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Id. “The Sixth
Amendment,” therefore, “guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect
advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” Id.; accord Burt v. Titlow, 571
U.S. 12, 24 (2013); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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Thus, to prove deficient performance, a defendant must do more than
merely rebut the strong presumption that “under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689 (cleaned up).

A defendant must ultimately prove that his

counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland 466 U.S. at 688; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 481.
The Supreme Court has distilled the rule to this:

counsel’s

representation is objectively reasonable, and therefore constitutionally
compliant, unless “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as he did.
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124.
The State made this argument in Jamieson and this Court rejected it in
a footnote, asserting that the argument was “not supported by [Utah] case
law.” 2017 UT App 236, ¶37 n.7. But “the standard of proof for claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel … is a matter of federal law, on which [Utah
Court’s] are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent.” State v. Sessions,
2014 UT 44, ¶37, 342 P.3d 738). The above-cited case law demonstrates that
Strickland’s deficient-performance prong require a defendant to prove
objectively unreasonable performance, not the mere absence of a conceivable
tactical basis for counsel’s action.
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2. Defendant has not shown that counsel’s stipulation that
Defendant was competent was objectively unreasonable
where all evidence demonstrated that Defendant was
competent.
Reasonable counsel could decide to stipulate to Defendant’s
competency because all the evidence showed that Defendant was competent.
The competency evaluations resolved counsel’s earlier concerns about
Defendant’s competency and there is no other evidence that Defendant was
incompetent.
When Defendant committed his crimes, the Utah Code provided that:
a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a
mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either in:
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of
the proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for
the offense charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in
the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding.
Utah Code Ann. §77-15-2 (2017).
There is no evidence that Defendant met this standard. Rather, all the
evidence showed that Defendant was competent: two psychologists found
that he was and his statements to both police and to the trial court further
demonstrated that he was.
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Evaluations.
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Police Interview.

Defendant also demonstrated his competency

during his police interview. During that interview, Defendant was able to
coherently describe a defense. He claimed that although he was in the
apartment where others involved were later located, Defendant said that he
was kissing his girlfriend in the bathroom when he heard gunshots and that
he left the apartment only after the gunshots. SE#64 at 10:50-11:05;13:0014:35. Defendant was able to recall and relate what he did in the hours and
minutes both before and after the shooting. SE#64 at 7:08-14:35.
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Defendant also demonstrated the ability to understand the significance
of the evidence against him. When the Detective said that Defendant’s
fingerprints were on the gun, Defendant first claimed that he had never seen
the gun, but later claimed that someone had pulled that gun on him two days
before the shooting. SE#64 at 28:00-29:35. He maintained that he had never
touched the gun. SE#64 at 30:20-30:35. Towards the end of the recorded
interview, the detective left the room while Defendant called his mother on
the detective’s phone. SE#64 at 32:00-41:00. Defendant showed that he
comprehended the significance of the evidence against him when he told his
mother “They have all this s---. All this s---. Even though I—even though it
wasn’t me you know how many people that they got f----n tellin’.” SE#64 at
34:20-34:40.
Defendant was also able to logically explain why the police should not
suspect him. He reasoned that if he were guilty, he would have fled rather
than stay in Utah where the police could find him. SE#64 at 5:45-6:55;17:3018:00. He explained that it would be “just dumb” to shoot someone and not
flee and asked “Why would I do some stupid s--- like that?” SE#64 at 12:3012:55. He reminded the officer that he did not flee or hide. SE#64 at 12:4612:55. Defendant later added that he was “a straight-up person” who would
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confess if he were guilty. SE#64 at 17:30-18:00. He then explained what he
would have done if he were guilty. He told the detective, “I wouldn’t even
be here right now, I wouldn’t even be in Utah…. That is stupid to stay out
here if I did do some stuff like this.” SE#64 at 17:30-18:00.
Defendant was also able to offer a reasoned explanation for his inability
to recall the names of anyone else in the apartment besides Isaiah Moncada
and Luis Lara. The detective insisted that Defendant must have at least
known the others’ names because he would have introduced himself to
people he did not know. SE#64 at 15:00-17:20. Defendant maintained that he
did not know any of the others’ names and explained he was not the kind of
person who introduced himself to others or who wanted to make friends.
SE#64 at 16:45-17:20.
Defendant consistently maintained his innocence, despite the
detective’s persistence, including telling Defendant that the victim had
identified him and that his fingerprints were on the gun. SE#64 at 5:45-31:15.
Plea Colloquy. Finally, Defendant also demonstrated his competency
when he pled guilty to the bifurcated possession of a firearm charge. R13440;R1251-60. As part of that plea, Defendant certified in a plea affidavit that
he believed himself “to be of sound and discerning mind” and “mentally
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capable of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of [his]
plea.” R179. He further certified that he was “free of any mental disease,
defect, or impairment that would prevent [him] from understanding what
[he was] doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering
[his] plea.” R179. His counsel also certified that he had discussed the plea
affidavit with Defendant and that counsel believed Defendant “fully
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically
competent.” R180. Utah courts have relied on a defendant’s and his counsel’s
representations during a plea colloquy, and the defendant’s demonstrated
abilities during the colloquy, as evidence of competency. See Helbach v. State,
2009 UT App 375U, ¶4; Ellis v. State, 2014 UT 50, ¶4, 321 P.3d 1174; York v.
Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1994).
Defendant’s two competency evaluations, his police interview, and his
plea colloquy all demonstrated that he had a rational and factual understand
of both the criminal proceedings against him and the specified punishments
for his crimes.

See Utah Code. Ann. §77-15-5(2).

This evidence also

demonstrated that Defendant had the ability to consult with his counsel with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding. See id. In short, it conclusively
demonstrated Defendant’s competence.
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Given this evidence, reasonable counsel could decide to stipulate to
Defendant’s competency. Reliance on mental-health “experts’ unanimous
conclusion” that a defendant is competent is “a reasonable exercise of
professional judgment.” Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, ¶23, 20 P.3d 382. Here,
not only did the psychologists unanimously agree that Defendant was
competent, Defendant demonstrated his competence during his police
interview and plea colloquy.

Counsel’s stipulation therefore did not

constitute deficient performance. See id.
3. The evaluations dispelled trial counsel’s initial concerns
about Defendant’s competency.
Defendant argues that the competency evaluations “confirmed” trial
counsel’s initial concerns about Defendant’s competency: that Defendant did
“‘not appear to be able to comprehend what is going on[, o]r make rational
decisions regarding this case.’” Br.Aplt.12 (quoting R37). Defendant relies
on two aspects of the evaluations to support this assertion. He first states that

Br.Aplt.12-13.

Defendant also relies on an isolated sentence from the

summary portion of Dr. Wilkinson’s evaluation which states that

-30-

Br.Aplt.12-13 (quoting R41) (emphasis added).
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See United States v. Bell, 280 Fed. Appx.
548, 550 (7th Cir. 2008). “[A] low IQ score alone is not enough to show that a
defendant is incompetent.” Id. Indeed, as noted, even though Dr. Hawks
concluded that

Second, the “not” in Dr. Wilkinson’s summary statement is most
reasonably read to be a typographical error. R41.
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In short, the evaluations resolved any concerns about Defendant’s
competency and his police interview and plea colloquy further supported the
evaluators’ conclusions that he was competent. No evidence in the record
shows otherwise.

Counsel therefore reasonably decided to stipulate to

Defendant’s competency.
C. Defendant’s guilty plea waived any challenge to his conviction
for possessing a firearm as a restricted person.
Defendant purports to challenge in this appeal his convictions for both
attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a restricted person.
Br.Aplt.2,26. He does not differentiate between his convictions anywhere in
his brief. Br.Aplt.1-26.
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But Defendant cannot now challenge his firearm-possession conviction
because he pled guilty to that charge. R134-40;R1251-60. “‘The general rule
applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by
pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional
defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations.’” State v.
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶15, 167 P.3d 1046 (quoting State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275, 1278 (Utah 1989)).
Defendant’s guilty plea both explicitly and implicitly waived any
challenge to his firearm-possession conviction. The plea explicitly waived
any challenge to this conviction based on alleged incompetency when, as
mentioned, both Defendant and his counsel certified during the plea colloquy
that Defendant was competent to plead guilty. R179,180. And even without
these certifications, the guilty plea implicitly waived all nonjurisdictional
defects in this conviction. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶15. Defendant therefore
can challenge only his attempted-murder conviction.
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II.
Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for not
consulting with one of the evaluators because this claim
depends on extra-record evidence.
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because counsel did
not consult with one of the evaluators, Dr. Hawks, before he completed his
evaluation. Br.Aplt.16. Defendant asserts that his counsel had additional
concerns and observations about Defendant’s competency but failed to share
them with Dr. Hawks. Br.Aplt.17-20. Defendant argues that his counsel
performed deficiently because there was “no conceivable tactical basis” not
to discuss counsel’s concerns with Dr. Hawks.

Br.Aplt.17.

Defendant

contends that he suffered prejudice because he reasons that his counsel’s
observations, coupled with Defendant’s mentally retardation, “would have
led the court to conclude that [Defendant] was incompetent.” Br.Aplt.20.
Defendant cannot prove that his counsel was ineffective in this regard
because trial counsel’s alleged additional concerns and observations about
Defendant’s competency are not part of the record. Rather, they are listed in
a short affidavit that Defendant references and attaches to his brief.
Br.Aplt.18-20,Addendum D. Defendant seeks a rule 23B remand to include
counsel’s additional observations in the record. Br.Aplt.18.
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Absent a rule 23B remand, Defendant cannot prove that his counsel
was ineffective. To prove an ineffectiveness claim, Defendant must “point[]
to specific instances in the record demonstrating both counsel’s deficient
performance and the prejudice it caused [him].” State v. Griffin, 2015 UT 18,
¶16, __ P.3d __. Because this claim depends on extra-record evidence, this
Court cannot hold that Defendant’s counsel was ineffective absent a remand.2
See id.
III.
The cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable because a single
prejudicial error would entitle Defendant to relief and, in any
event, Defendant has shown no error.
Defendant argues that if the errors he has alleged are not sufficiently
prejudicial on their own, they are sufficiently prejudicial together.
Br.Aplt.22-26.

The cumulative-error doctrine applies only when “the

This Court should strike counsel’s affidavit, contained in Defendant’s
Addendum D, and all references to it in Defendant’s brief. This Court will
“‘consider [evidence] supporting Rule 23B motions solely to determine the
propriety of remanding ineffective assistance of counsel claims for
evidentiary hearings.’” Id. (quoting State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah
App.1998)). A party cannot supplement the appellate record “by simply
including the omitted material in the party’s addendum.” State v. Pliego, 1999
UT 8, ¶ 7, 974 P.2d 279. Defendant’s Addendum D and all references thereto
in his brief, are therefore improperly included in his brief.
2
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cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [this Court’s confidence]
... that a fair trial was had.” State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶39, 872
Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (quotation and citation omitted). Only errors that are
“substantial” enough to have some “conceivable potential for harm” can
accumulate into reversible error. Id. ¶¶40-42.
The cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable here for two reasons.
First, proof of prejudice on either of Defendant’s claims would entitle him to
relief. As explained, to prove prejudice, Defendant must prove that there is
a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s allegedly deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have been found
incompetent. See State v. Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶16, 428 P.3d 36. That
showing alone—had Defendant made it—would justify relief.
But even if that showing were somehow insufficient on a single claim,
Defendant has shown not shown any error at all. The cumulative-error
doctrine is therefore inapplicable because there are no errors to accumulate.
See Martinez-Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ¶39.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.
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